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WORKERS AND LABOR UNIONS SUSTAINED MAJOR
DEFEATS IN THE 2017-2018 SUPREME COURT TERM IN
EPIC SYSTEMS AND JANUS. HOW BAD IS IT?
EDWARD J. SCHOEN
I. INTRODUCTION
During the 2017-2018 Supreme Court Term, five conservative U.S.
Supreme Court justices coalesced to inflict serious legal damage on workers
and labor unions in two major decisions: Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis1 and
Janus v. American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees,
Council 31.2 In Epic Systems, the Court ruled that that arbitration agreements
in which the employees waive the right to pursue collective action to recover
overtime wages allegedly due under the Fair Labor Standards Act are
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act.3 This ruling overturns a prior
decision of the National Labor Relations Board holding that the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 nullified arbitration agreements that prohibited
employees of a home builder with operations in over twenty states from
pursuing class actions to challenge their classification as exempt employees
and pursue claims for overtime compensation.4 In Janus, the Court ruled the


J.D., Professor of Management, Rohrer College of Business, Rowan University, Glassboro,
New Jersey 08028.
1
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority
opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Alito joined.
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan
joined.
2
Janus v. American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S.
Ct. 2446 (2018). This double defeat is reminiscent of labor union’s losses in Ysursa v.
Pocatello Education Association, 555 U.S. 353 (2009) (permitting local municipalities to
refuse to provide payroll deductions for contributions by public employees to the union’s
political action committee by public employees), and Davenport v. Washington Education
Association, 551 U.S. 177 (2007) (upholding a State of Washington statute requiring public
sector labor unions to receive affirmative authorization from individuals who were not
member of the union but on whose behalf the union negotiate a collective bargaining
agreement before spending their agency fees for ideological or political purposes unrelated to
the union’s collective bargaining responsibilities). See Edward J. Schoen & Joseph S. Falchek,
Ysursa and Davenport: Putting a Dent in Union Access to Member Contributions, XIX S.L.J
77 (2009), http://www.southernlawjournal.com/2009/06_Schoen-Falchek.pdf.
3
Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1633.
4
Id. at 1620-21. See D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, and D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB,
737 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2013). This NLRB decision was subsequently endorsed by the
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collection of agency fees from public employees who “choose not to join the
union and strongly object to the positions the union takes in collective
bargaining and related activities” violated the First Amendment rights of
those employees not to be compelled to subsidize private speech on matters
of public concern.5 This decision severs the obligation of public sector
employees to pay fees or dues to their unions, even if those unions
collectively bargain on behalf of those employees, and will likely negatively
impact not only union revenues but also union membership.6
The purpose of this article is to review Epic Systems and Janus to
ascertain how workers and labor unions are affected by these decisions. Part
II of this article will examine the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Epic
Systems. Part III will examine the potential damage the Epic Systems
decision inflicts on American workers. Part IV will examine the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Janus. Part V will examine the potential damage
Janus inflicts on labor unions.

II. EPIC SYSTEMS CORP. V. LEWIS
In Epic Systems, employees in three companies, Epic Systems Corp.,
Ernst & Young LLP, and Murphy Oil USA, Inc., signed employment
agreements which required them to arbitrate any employment claim against
the company, limited the claims arbitrated solely to individual claims, and
prohibited the arbitration of class action claims. The U.S. Supreme Court
noted that the three cases “differ in detail but not in substance” and utilized
the facts in the Ernst and Young case as illustrative.7 After his employment
ended, Stephen Morris, an Ernst and Young junior accountant, claimed the
firm misclassified its junior accountants as professional employees and
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA) by failing to pay them
overtime compensation. Morris pursued a class action claim in federal
district court on behalf of a nationwide class under the FLSA’s collective
action provision. In response, Ernst and Young filed a motion to compel
arbitration. The district court granted the motion, but the Ninth Circuit
reversed, reasoning that the FLSA’s “savings clause” removes the
Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal, but rejected by the Fifth Circuit. Epic
Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1620. See NLRB v. Alternative Entertainment, Inc., 858 F.3d 393 (6th
Cir. 2017); Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp, 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016) (case below in No. 16285); Morris v. Ernst & Young LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) (case below in No. 16-300);
and Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015) (case below in 16-307).
5
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460.
6
Mark J. Stern, Neil Gorsuch Just Demolished Labor Rights, ATLANTIC (May 21, 2018),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/05/neil-gorsuch-demolished-labor-rights-in-epicsystems-v-lewis.html.
7
Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1620.
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requirement of the Federal Arbitration Act that arbitration agreements be
enforced as written.8 More particularly, the savings clause permits courts to
refuse to enforce arbitration agreements “upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”9 The Ninth Circuit decided
that the Ernst and Young employment agreement prohibiting class action
arbitration violated § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, which provides
that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,”10 and
hence fell within the “savings clause” and rendered the arbitration agreement
unenforceable.
The U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Federal Arbitration Act
permitted employers to exclude class action claims from its arbitration
provisions, and reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ernst and Young and
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Epic Systems and affirmed the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Murphy Oil.11 In doing so, the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed three major issues: (1) whether the savings clause of the Federal
Arbitration Act rendered the prohibition against class action arbitration
proceedings in the employment agreements unenforceable; (2) whether
“concerted activities” provision of National Labor Relations Act overrides
the savings clause of the Federal Arbitration Act; and (3) whether Chevron
deference applied to the decision of the NLRB striking down prohibitions on
class action arbitration proceedings.
Concerning the first issue, the Court noted that “the savings clause
recognizes only defenses that apply to ‘any’ contract,” i.e., the savings clause
“permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by generally applicable
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,” but those
defenses do not include “defenses that apply only to arbitration” or defenses
that “derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at
issue.”12 In other words, the Court explained, “the saving clause does not
save defenses that target arbitration either by name or by more subtle
methods, such as by ‘interfer[ing] with fundamental attributes of arbitration.’
”13 Relying on its prior decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,14 the
Court determined that the “concerted activities” provision in the National
8

Id.
9 U.S.C. § 2, Act Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, § 2, 43 Stat. 883. Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1622.
10
29 U.S.C. § 157, July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I, § 101,
61 Stat. 140. Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1620.
11
Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1632.
12
Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1622.
13
Id.
14
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
9
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Labor Relations Act constituted a defense of legality which attempts to
interfere with one of arbitration’s fundamental attributes, rather than a
generally applicable contract defense.15
In Concepcion, Vincent and Liza Concepcion, who purchased
cellphones from AT&T Mobility and were required to pay sales tax on the
retail value of the phones, pursued a class action lawsuit in U.S. District
Court in the Southern District of California against AT&T Mobility for false
advertising and fraud for promoting the sale of “free phones.” The
consumers’ sales agreement contained an arbitration clause which restricted
arbitration claims to individuals and prohibited any class action or
representative arbitration proceeding.16 When AT&T Mobility moved to
compel arbitration under the terms of the sales agreement, the Conceptions
opposed the motion on the grounds the arbitration agreement was
unconscionable under California law, because it prohibited class action
arbitration claims. Relying on the California Supreme Court decision in
Discover Bank v. Superior Court,17 the district court determined that the
arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it prohibited class action
arbitrations, and denied AT&T Mobility’s motion. Also relying on Discover
Bank, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.18 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed,
because, unless the arbitration agreement explicitly permits class action
arbitration claims, the Discover Bank rule interferes with arbitration by
imposing additional burdens on the arbitrator to “first decide, for example,
whether the class itself may be certified, whether the named parties are
sufficiently representative and typical, and how discovery for the class
should be conducted.”19 Moreover, “class arbitration requires procedural
formality,” because, in order for the class action to be binding on absentees
in the class, they must be adequately represented at all times, be afforded
notice and an opportunity to be heard, and have a right to opt out of the
15

Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1622.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 336.
17
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.4th 148 (2005). The California Supreme Court
determined the waiver of class action arbitration proceedings in arbitration agreements was
unconscionable.
[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in
which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts
of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining
power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers
out of individually small sums of money, then ... the waiver becomes in practice
the exemption of the party ‘from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful
injury to the person or property of another.’ Under these circumstances, such
waivers are unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced. Id.
at 162.
18
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 337-38.
19
Id. at 348.
16
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class.20 Likewise, “arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class
litigation.”21 Procedural safeguards are built into class action litigation, such
as interlocutory appeal of the certification decision and a separate appeal
from the final judgment; in contrast an arbitral award can be vacated by a
court only when the award “was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means,” the arbitrators displayed evident partiality or corruption, the
arbitrators wrongfully refused to postpone the hearing or to hear pertinent
and material evidence, or the arbitrators exceeded or misused their powers or
failed to make a “mutual, final, and definite award.”22 Further, while the
parties may contractually agree to undertake class action arbitration, the court
found “it hard to believe that defendants would bet the company with no
effective means of review, and even harder to believe that Congress would
have intended to allow state courts to force such a decision.”23 Hence, the
Court concluded, because California’s Discover Bank rule is an “obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress,” it was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.24
The U.S. Supreme Court in Epic Systems determined that Concepcion
prevents the Court from allowing a “contract defense to reshape traditional
individualized arbitration by mandating classwide arbitration procedures
without the parties consent.” Quite simply, “[j]ust as judicial antagonism
toward arbitration before the Arbitration Act’s enactment manifested itself in
a great variety of devices and formulas declaring arbitration to be against
public policy,” so too must courts “be alert to new devices and formulas that
would achieve much the same result today. And a rule seeking to declare
individualized arbitration proceedings off limits is, the Court held, just such a
device.”25 The Court concluded:
The law of precedent teaches that like cases should generally be
treated alike, and appropriate respect for that principle means the
Arbitration Act's saving clause can no more save the defense at
issue in these cases than it did the defense at issue in Concepcion.
At the end of our encounter with the Arbitration Act, then, it
appears just as it did at the beginning: a congressional command
requiring us to enforce, not override, the terms of the arbitration
agreements before us.26
20

Id. at 349.
Id. at 350.
22
Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10).
23
Id. at 351.
24
Id. at 352.
25
Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1623.
26
Id.
21
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Concerning the second issue – whether the “concerted activities”
language in Section 7 of the NLRA overrides the Federal Arbitration Act –
the Court initially noted that the party seeking a determination that one
statute displaces another has “a heavy burden” to demonstrate “a clearly
expressed congressional intention that such a result should follow.”27 Section
7 of the NLRA guarantees workers “the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection.”28 This language, the Court insisted, not only “does not express
approval or disapproval of arbitration,” but does not “mention class or
collective action procedures” or “even hint at a wish to displace the
Arbitration Act – let alone accomplish that much clearly and manifestly, as
our precedents demand.”29 Further, the Court noted, “some forms of group
litigation existed even in 1935.” Hence “Section 7’s failure to mention them
only reinforces that the statute doesn’t speak to such procedures.” Likewise,
when a general term follows specific terms in a list, “the general term is
usually understood to ‘embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects
enumerated by the preceding specific words.’ ”30 Thus the term “other
concerted activities” should be construed as encompassing activities
employees do for themselves in the course of exercising their free association
rights in the workplace, rather than highly regulated and more convoluted
courtroom activities involving class and joint litigation.31 Similarly, the Court
noted, “when Congress wants to mandate particular dispute resolution
procedures it knows exactly how to do so,” and when Congress wanted to
override the Arbitration Act, it clearly explained what it was trying to
accomplish.32 Therefore, the “fact that we have nothing like that here is
further evidence that Section 7 does nothing to address the question of class
and collective actions.”33

27

Id. at 1624.
29 U.S.C. § 157. Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1624.
29
Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1624.
30
Id. at 1625 (citing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001) (“the maxim
ejusdem generis [is] the statutory canon that ‘[w]here general words follow specific words in a
statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in
nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words’ ”)).
31
Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1625.
32
Id. at 1626 (“by explaining, for example, that, ‘[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
law, ... arbitration may be used ... only if’ certain conditions are met, 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)”;
or that “[n]o predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable” in other
circumstances, 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2); 12 U.S.C. § 5567(d)(2); or that requiring a party to
arbitrate is ‘unlawful’ in other circumstances yet, 10 U.S.C. § 987(e)(3).”).
33
Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1626.
28
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Furthermore, the Court noted that it “has heard and rejected efforts to
conjure conflicts between the Arbitration Act and other federal statutes” and
“rejected every such effort to date . . . with statutes ranging from the
Sherman and Clayton Acts to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
the Credit Repair Organizations Act, the Securities Act of 1933, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act.”34 In rejecting those efforts, the Court has made it clear
that “even a statute's express provision for collective legal actions” does not
necessarily preclude individual arbitration, and that “the absence of any
specific statutory discussion of arbitration or class actions is an important and
telling clue that Congress has not displaced the Arbitration Act.” The Court
then noted, that ‘[i]f all the statutes in all those cases did not provide a
congressional command sufficient to displace the Arbitration Act, we cannot
imagine how we might hold that the NLRA alone and for the first time does
so today.”
Concerning the third issue – whether Chevron deference applied to the
decision of the NLRB striking down prohibitions on class action arbitration
proceedings – the Court concluded “even under Chevron’s terms, no
deference is due.”35 Quite simply, the Court noted, the NLRB in issuing its
decision not only sought to interpret the NLRA in isolation, but also to limit
a second statute, the Arbitration Act, which it does not administer, contrary
to the Chevron mandate that the statutory ambiguity to be resolved appears in
the statute the agency administers.36 In effect, the Court noted, the NLRB
was attempting to “advance its statutory mission” by diminishing the scope
of second statute, about which the agency has no particular interest or
expertise, thereby “bootstrapping itself into an area in which it has no
jurisdiction” and threatening “to undo rather than honor legislative
judgment.”37 Furthermore, the Court observed, Chevron deference is
34
Id. at 1627 (citing American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228 (2013)
(upholding class-action waiver provision in mandatory arbitration clause to foreclose
restaurant’s attempt to pursue a class antitrust action); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp,
500 U.S. 20 (1991) (age discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant
to arbitration agreement in securities registration application); CompuCredit Corp. v.
Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95 (2012) (Credit Repair Organization Act (CROA) provisions
requiring credit repair organizations to disclose to consumers their right to sue for violations of
CROA and prohibiting waiver of any right under CROA did not preclude enforcement of an
arbitration agreement); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477 (1989) (predispute agreement to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act was
enforceable); and Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)
(customer claims under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, including RICO claims
against the broker, were arbitrable under predispute arbitration agreement)).
35
Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1639.
36
Id. at 1629.
37
Id.
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provided to assist Executive Branch officials, who are directly accountable to
the people, make policy choices. Unfortunately, the Court stated, it is
difficult to grant deference when the Executive Branch appears to be of “two
minds,” the NLRB and the Solicitor General having submitted briefs
disputing the meaning of the NLRA. Hence, “whatever argument might be
mustered for deferring to the Executive on grounds of political
accountability, surely it becomes a garble when the Executive speaks from
both sides of its mouth, articulating no single position on which it might be
held accountable.” Under these circumstances, the Court declared, “we will
not defer.”38
The Court concluded, “Congress has instructed that arbitration
agreements like those before us must be enforced as written. While Congress
is of course always free to amend this judgment, we see nothing suggesting it
did so in the NLRA – much less that it manifested a clear intention to
displace the Arbitration Act.” Rather, the Court said, “we can easily read
Congress’s statutes to work in harmony” and “that is where our duty lies.”39

III. EPIC SYSTEMS’ IMPACT ON EMPLOYEES
The most significant damage inflicted by Epic Systems is identified by
Justice Ginsburg in her dissenting opinion, namely the diminishment of
employees’ ability to “pursue joint, collective, and class suits related to the
terms and conditions of their employment,”40 despite numerous decisions of
the NLRB permitting workers to pursue collective FSLA and terms and
condition of employment civil actions.41 Justice Ginsburg notes that “for
decades, federal courts have endorsed the Board's view, comprehending that
‘the filing of a labor related civil action by a group of employees is ordinarily
a concerted activity protected by § 7.’”42 The Court’s decision that
38

Id. at 1630.
Id. at 1632.
40
Id. at 1637.
41
Id. at 1637-38 (citing Spandsco Oil and Royalty Co., 42 N.L.R.B. 942, 948-49 (1942) (three
employees' joint filing of FLSA suit ranked as concerted activity protected by the NLRA);
Poultrymen's Service Corp., 41 N.L.R.B. 444, 460-63, and n. 28 (1942) (employee's filing of
joint FLSA suit on behalf of himself and others similarly situated is concerted activity
protected by the NLRA), enf'd, 138 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1943); Sarkes Tarzian, Inc., 149
N.L.R.B. 147, 149, 153 (1964) (employees' filing class libel suit was protected by the NLRA);
United Parcel Service, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 1015, 1018 (1980) (employee's filing class action
regarding break times is protected by the NLRA), enf'd, 677 F.2d 421 (6th Cir. 1982); and
Harco Trucking, LLC, 344 N.L.R.B. 478, 478-79 (2005) (employee's maintaining class action
regarding wages is protected by the NLRA)). Similarly, federal courts for several decades
have endorsed the Board's view that “the filing of a labor related civil action by a group of
employees is ordinarily a concerted activity protected by § 7.”
42
Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1638.
39
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“collective proceedings do not fall within the scope of § 7” weakens a
significant safeguard of employees’ NLRA rights, because employers can
now prevent class and collective actions merely by inserting the prohibition
into the employment agreement. As Justice Ginsburg observes, “[f]orced to
face their employers without company, employees ordinarily are no match
for the enterprise that hires them,”43 which “is the very reason the NLRA
secures against employer interference employees right to act in concert for
the ‘mutual aid or protection.’ ”44
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg states, the “inevitable result of today's
decision will be the under enforcement of federal and state statutes designed
to advance the well-being of vulnerable workers.”45 Chief among these are
minimum wage and overtime law protections afforded workers. Noting that
one study estimated low-wage workers lose almost $3 billion in legally owed
wages in Chicago, Los Angeles and New York City alone and that another
study claims that wage theft is costing workers hundreds of millions of
dollars a year, Justice Ginsburg warns that federal and state government
agencies and state attorneys general necessarily rely on private parties to play
a leading role in enforcing wage and hour laws. The employees’ ability to do
so, however, is seriously thwarted if “employers can stave off collective
43

Id. at 1640.
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 158. This causes Justice Ginsburg to declare: “Because I
would hold that employees' § 7 rights include the right to pursue collective litigation regarding
their wages and hours, I would further hold that the employer-dictated collective-litigation
stoppers, i.e., “waivers,” are unlawful.”) Id. at 1641. The impact on nonunion employees will
be enormous. As noted by Nina Totenberg:
A study by the left-leaning Economic Policy Institute shows that 56 percent of
nonunion private-sector employees are currently subject to mandatory individual
arbitration procedures under the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act, which allows
employers to bar collective legal actions by employees. The court's decision
means that tens of millions of private nonunion employees will be barred from
suing collectively over the terms of their employment. Nina Totenberg, Supreme
Court Decision Delivers Blow to Workers' Rights, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 21,
2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/05/21/605012795/supreme-court-decisiondelivers-blow-to-workers-rights.
This impact is confirmed by the Los Angeles Times:
About 60 million nonunionized workers in the private sector are covered by
arbitration agreements that bar them from going to court to sue over alleged
violations of federal workplace laws, according to a survey by the Economic
Policy Institute, a liberal group based in Washington. Among them, about 25
million are also required to arbitrate as individuals. Lawyers predicted Monday
that number will rise quickly. David G. Savage, Supreme Court upholds
arbitration that bans workers from joining forces over lost wages, L.A. TIMES
(May 21, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-court-workers20180521-story.html.
45
Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1646.
44
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employment litigation aimed at obtaining redress for wage and hours
infractions” by simply restricting employee relief to individual claims.46
Likewise, because the expense in pursuing individual claims outweigh the
potential recovery, there is no incentive to seek redress and the “enforcement
gap” will almost certainly widen.47 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg cautions,
“fear of retaliation may also deter potential claimants from seeking redress
alone,” individuals’ pursuit of small value claims obtain slim injunctive
relief, and “[e]mployers, aware that employees will be disinclined to pursue
small-value claims when confined to proceeding one-by-one, will no doubt
perceive that the cost-benefit balance of underpaying workers tips heavily in
favor of skirting legal obligations.”48 Finally, Justice Ginsburg warns,
because arbitration outcomes can be kept confidential and lack precedential
effect, “individual arbitration of employee complaints can give rise to
anomalous results.”49 That means arbitrators can render incompatible awards
in similar claims and inconsistent legal decisions, such as whether the
employee’s position is exempt from overtime laws. All of these negative
consequences cause Justice Ginsburg to fear that “the result of take-it-orleave-it labor contracts [harks] back to the type called ‘yellow dog,’50 and of
46
Id. at 1647. Inserting “these clauses make it easier for employers to maintain unfair and
even unlawful employment structures and salary systems,” and the “court’s decision in Epic
Systems will inevitably lead to an explosion of these imposed contracts.” Garrett Epps, An
Epic Supreme Court Decision on Employment, ATLANTIC (May 22, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/05/an-epic-supreme-court-decision-onemployment/560963.
47
Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1647.
48
Id. at 1647-48. This conclusion is corroborated by an article in the Los Angeles Times which
reports: “Labor law experts said the impact of the ruling in Epic Systems vs. Lewis will fall
heaviest on tens of millions of low-wage workers who do not belong to unions. As a practical
matter, they said, workers at convenience stores, restaurants, hotels or the like will find it
expensive and risky to bring complaints if they must do so on their own.” Epps, supra note 46.
One commentator was even more blunt, stating: Epic Systems “effectively legalizes low-level
wage theft; Juno Turner, a partner at the workers’ rights firm Outten & Golden, told me that it
‘gives a free pass for companies to break the law,’ because “employers can now cheat workers
with little risk that employees will enforce their rights.” Stern, supra note 6.
49
Id. at 1648.
50
“Yellow Dog” contracts were employment agreements in which the worker, as a condition
of employment, promised not to join a union or to resign from a union if he or she was already
a member. Yellow-dog contract, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, accessed on October 1, 2018 at
https://www.britannica.com/topic/yellow-dog-contract. In the early stages of the Lochner era,
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Yellow Dog contracts in Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). In Adair, the Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment due
process clause protected individual’s right to make contracts for the purchase of the labor of
others and the sale of one’s own labor. As long as those terms were not injurious to public
interests, the employer had the right to include terms which benefited the employer, and the
employee had the right to insist on the terms upon which he would become an employee. Id. at
172-73. It was the employer’s right to fire the employee because he was a member of a union,
just as it was the right of employee to decline employment because his coworkers were not
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the readiness of this Court to enforce those unbargained-for agreements”
suppresses “the right of workers to take concerted action for their ‘mutual aid
and protection.’ ”51

IV. JANUS V. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES
The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,
Council 31 (hereinafter “Council 31” or “the union”), is the exclusive
bargaining agent for employees of the Illinois Department of Healthcare and
Family Services (hereinafter “Family Services”). Mark Janus, a child support
specialist employed by Family Services, refused to join the union. Janus
opposed the positions Council 31 adopted in its collective bargaining
activities, because the wage demands of the union would aggravate the fiscal
crisis then confronting the State of Illinois. Janus also objected to making the
mandatory agency fee payment of $44.58 per month to the union to cover his
share of the “chargeable” expenditures of the union for collective bargaining,
contract administration, and dispute resolution activities. Janus and two other
state employees filed a petition to intervene in an action previously initiated
in federal district court by the Governor of Illinois, who challenged the
imposition of the agency fee under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.
members of a union, “however unwise” those decisions might have been. Id. at 175. The
Wagner Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., effectively overruled Adair, when it gave
employees the right to join unions and bargain collectively with their employees, and outlawed
yellow dog contracts and other unfair labor practices.
51
Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1648-49. As noted by one commentator:
The Supreme Court . . . decision in Epic Systems v. Lewis [allows] employers to
deprive their workers of their right to sue collectively. Its ruling . . . blasts a massive
hole through post–New Deal labor law, hobbling employees’ ability to recover in
court when their employers underpay them. It is difficult to overstate how
devastating Epic Systems is to labor rights in America . . . .” Stern, supra note 6.
Justice Ginsburg’s “yellow dog” comment caught Justice Gorsuch’s attention. He responded:
“In [the dissent’s] view, today's decision ushers us back to the Lochner era when this Court
regularly overrode legislative policy judgments. The dissent even suggests we have
resurrected the long-dead ‘yellow dog’ contract. But like most apocalyptic warnings, this one
proves a false alarm.” Id. at 1630. In his dissenting opinion in Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of
D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), one of the Lochner era opinions in which the U.S. Supreme Court
declared a minimum wage law unconstitutional, Chief Justice Taft reminds us why workers
must take concerted action for their mutual aid and protection:
Legislatures in limiting freedom of contract between employee and employer by a
minimum wage proceed on the assumption that employees, in the class receiving
least pay, are not upon a full level of equality of choice with their employer and in
their necessitous circumstances are prone to accept pretty much anything that is
offered. They are peculiarly subject to the overreaching of the harsh and greedy
employer. Id. at 562-63.
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The district court simultaneously granted Janus’ petition to intervene in the
action and dismissed the Governor’s lawsuit, because, not having suffered a
personal injury, the Governor lacked standing. Janus then filed his complaint
in which he claimed the mandatory agency fee payments were “coerced
political speech” contrary to the First Amendment, and the case proceeded on
the basis of his complaint.52
The district court granted Council 31’s motion to dismiss Janus’s
complaint, because Janus’ claim was prohibited by a prior decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.53 In Abood the
Court unanimously upheld a Michigan statute, which authorized union
representation of state and municipal employees in an “agency shop”
arrangement, and determined that the imposition of the agency fee on nonunion members did not violate the First Amendment.54 Janus appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court, asking the Court to overrule Abood and hold agency
fees arrangements are unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari.55
Janus is the fourth time since the Abood decision that Justice Alito has
taken aim at mandatory agency fees. In Knox v. Service Employees
International Union, Local 1000, public employees, who were represented
by Local 1000 for collective bargaining in an agency shop arrangement,
objected to a unilateral increase in union dues used to finance an opposition
campaign to two proposed ballot propositions: Proposition 75, which would
require unions to obtain the employees affirmative consent before charging
them fees used for political purposes, and Proposition 76, which empowered
the governor to reduce state appropriations for public employee
compensation.56 The district court agreed with the objecting union members,
and ordered the union to send a new Hudson notice57 to the union members
52

Janus v. American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees, 138 S. Ct. 2446,
2460-62, 2475 (2018).
53
Id. at 2462.
54
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 235-38 (1977).
55
Janus, 138 U.S. at 2462.
56
Knox v. Service Employees International Union. Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 302-04 (2012).
57
In Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), several workers represented by
the union objected to the use of their dues for purposes not related to collective bargaining and
challenged the procedure implemented by the union to handle their objections. Id. at 297. The
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the procedures enacted by the union to deal with nonmember
objections were inadequate for three reasons. First, the union was permitted to use the
objectors’ dues temporarily for purposes to which they objected, rather than preliminarily
obtaining their consent to finance activities unrelated to collective bargaining. Second, the
procedures failed to provide nonmembers with sufficient information about the basis on which
the proportionate share was calculated in advance of their raising an objection; instead, the
union provided information about the calculation of the proportionate share after the objectors
filed their objections. Further, the information ultimately provided to the objectors was
inadequate, because it failed to disclose the expenditures for collective bargaining and
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giving them 45 days to object and receive a full refund of that portion of their
dues used for political purposes. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit
reversed, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.58 Justice Alito stated
that the “free rider” justification for requiring union workers to pay the
“chargeable” portion of their union dues “represents something of an
anomaly – one that we found to be justified by the interest in furthering
‘labor peace.’ ”59 While he observed that permitting a union to collect fees
from nonmembers using an opt-out system approaches, if not crosses, the
limits of what the First Amendment tolerates under the Court’s prior
decisions, the “aggressive” fee collection process employed by Local 1000
“is indefensible.”60 To begin with, Local 1000 failed to give the nonmembers
a fresh Hudson notice before levying the special assessment. Doing so would
have permitted the nonmembers to elect not to support either or both of the
propositions, rather than using their dues to oppose both propositions and
then forcing them after the fact to wait for reimbursement.61 Second, forcing
union members to wait until the next annual Hudson notice was sent to
oppose the propositions did “not fully recompense nonmembers.”62 Indeed
even full recompense of the union dues used to oppose the propositions
administration that benefited all members and nonmembers alike and for which a fee could be
charged; the mere disclosure of a percentage of expenditures does not explain why they were
required to pay dues. Third, the procedure failed to provide “a reasonably prompt decision by
an impartial decision maker.” Id. at 307. The Court noted that the nonunion employee “is
entitled to have his objections addressed in expeditious, fair, and objective manner.” Id. The
procedure employed by the union did not meet this standard, because it permitted the union,
an interested party, to control the process from the moment the process begins (collection of
the dues), through the two-step appeal process (controlled by the union executive committee
and union executive board), and through the final arbitration (decided by a union-selected
arbitrator). Id. at 308. In sum, “the original Union procedure was inadequate, because it failed
to minimize the risk that nonunion employees’ contributions might be used for impermissible
purposes, because it failed to provide adequate justification for the advance reduction of dues,
and because it failed to offer a reasonably prompt decision by an impartial decision maker.”
Id. at 309. Notably, then, Hudson requires the union to make significant disclosures to
employees so that they can make an informed decision to object to the expenditures of dues
and fees for purposes not related to collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment. More particularly, the union must inform the employees (1) how it
calculated the proportion of expenditures for activities unrelated to collective bargaining,
contract administration, and grievance adjustment, and (2) the nature of expenditures included
under the category of collective bargaining and contract administration that benefited
members and nonmembers alike. Further, the union’s disclosure of this information must be
made before the employee is given the opportunity to object to expenditure of dues and fees
for purposes not related to collective bargaining and contract administration.
58
Knox, 567 U.S. at 306.
59
Id. at 311.
60
Id. at 314.
61
Id. at 315.
62
Id. at 316.
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would not satisfy the First Amendment, because it permits the union to
“extract a loan from unwilling nonmembers” and payment of loan after the
union’s political objectives were achieved is “cold comfort” to objecting
nonmembers.63 Third, Local 1000 employed the prior year’s audited
chargeable percentage when it sent out its annual Hudson notice, and doing
so “makes no sense,” because it wrongfully assumes that the percentages of
chargeable and nonchargeable expenses vary little from one year to the
next.64 Likewise, Local 1000 uses an impermissibly broad classification
system in allocating chargeable and nonchargeable expenses, claiming for
example that “all funds spent on ‘lobbying . . . the electorate’ are
chargeable.”65 Fourth, Local 1000 procedures force nonmembers who wish
to challenge the classification of expenses “to come up with the resources to
mount the legal challenge in a timely fashion,” placing a heavy burden on
objecting nonmembers “simply to avoid having their money taken to
subsidize speech with which they disagree.”66 Finally, extracting fees from
nonmembers and using an opt-out procedure to reclaim the extracted fees
when annual dues are billed, rather than employing opt-in procedure before
extracting fees from nonmembers, “substantially impinge[s] upon the First
Amendment rights of nonmembers.”67 Hence, the Court ruled, “when a
public-sector union imposes a special assessment or dues increase, the union
must provide a fresh Hudson notice and may not exact any funds from
nonmembers without their affirmative consent.”68
In Harris v. Quinn, an opinion also authored by Justice Alito, the Court
declined to extend Abood to personal assistants providing home health care
to individuals who otherwise would require institutionalization.69 By
executive order, Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich called for state
recognition of a union to serve as the personal assistants’ exclusive
representative for the purpose of collective bargaining with the state. Several
months later the Illinois legislature codified that order and declared those
personal assistants to be employees of the State of Illinois “solely for the
purposes of coverage under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.”
Following a vote of the personal assistants, SEIU Healthcare Illinois &
Indiana (SEIU-HII) was designated to be the personal assistants’ exclusive
representative for collective bargaining purposes. The State and the union
negotiated collective-bargaining agreements requiring the personal assistants
who were not members of the union to pay agency fees and permitting those
63

Id. at 317.
Id. at 318.
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Id. at 320.
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Id. at 319.
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Id. at 321.
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Id. at 322.
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Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014).
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fees (more than $3.6 million) to be deducted from the personal assistants’
Medicaid payments. Three personal assistants pursued a class action claim in
federal district court in which they sought an injunction against enforcement
of the agency fee provision and a determination that the mandatory payment
of the agency fees violates the First Amendment.70 The federal district court
dismissed their claims. The Seventh Circuit decided “that Illinois and the
customers who receive in-home care are ‘joint employers’ of the personal
assistants,” and “the State employs personal assistants within the meaning of
Abood.’”71 In his opinion reversing the Seventh Circuit, Justice Alito
castigates Abood. Justice Alito states (1) Abood failed to appreciate that core
issues such as wages, pensions, and benefits are important political issues in
the public sector, but generally are not important political issues in the
private sector;72 (2) Abood failed to appreciate the difficulty in distinguishing
core union speech related to collective bargaining and core union speech
related to political ends, both of which are directed to the government; in
contrast core union speech related to collective bargaining in the private
sector is directed to the employer and lobbying and political advocacy are
directed at the government;73 (3) Abood failed to anticipate the enormous
difficulty in classifying public-sector union expenditures as “chargeable” or
“non-chargeable”;74 (4) Abood failed to anticipate significant litigation
expense impose on union members who challenge the classification of
expenditures;75 and (5) Abood “rests on an unsupported empirical
assumption, namely, that the principle of exclusive representation in the
public sector is dependent on a union or agency shop.”76
Finally, in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, the U.S.
Supreme Court had its third crack at Abood. Upon the death of Justice Alito
on February 13, 2016, however, the Court was evenly divided, and, on March
29, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order affirming the judgment of the
Ninth Circuit.77
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Id. at 2626.
Id. at 2627.
72
Id. at 2632.
73
Id.
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Id. at 2633.
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Id.
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Id. at 2634.
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Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (citing Abood, the
Ninth Circuit issued the following order: “The court has reviewed appellants' motion for
summary affirmance and appellees' opposition thereto, the record, and the briefing filed in this
appeal. Upon review, the court finds that the questions presented in this appeal are so
insubstantial as not to require further argument, because they are governed by controlling
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent.” Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association,
2014 WL 10076847 (9th Cir. 2014). The decision affirmed by the Ninth Circuit is Friedrichs
v. California Teachers Ass’n, 2013 WL 9825479 (C.D. Cal. 2013). In Friedrichs, public
71
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In his opinion in Janus, Justice Alito first examines the justifications for
agency fees the court advanced in Abood: “labor peace” and the “risk of free
riders.” Justice Alito claims that “labor peace” is the “main defense of the
agency-fee arrangement,” i.e., “avoidance of the conflict and disruption that
[Abood] envisioned would occur if the employees in a unit were represented
by more than one union.”78 Justice Alito noted that Abood cited no evidence
“that the pandemonium it imagined would result if agency fees were not
allowed,” incorrectly assumed designating the union as the exclusive
bargaining agent and agency fees were inextricably linked, and declared “it is
now clear that Abood’s fears were unfounded,” as evidenced by the federal
and state government employment: 79
Under federal law, a union chosen by majority vote is designated as
the exclusive representative of all the employees, but federal law
does not permit agency fees. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7102, 7111(a),
7114(a). Nevertheless, nearly a million federal employees – about
27% of the federal work force – are union members. The situation
in the Postal Service is similar. Although permitted to choose an
exclusive representative, Postal Service employees are not required
to pay an agency fee, 39 U.S.C. §§ 1203(a), 1209(c), and about
400,000 are union members. Likewise, millions of public
employees in the 28 States that have laws generally prohibiting
agency fees are represented by unions that serve as the exclusive
representatives of all the employees. Whatever may have been the
case 41 years ago when Abood was handed down, it is now
undeniable that ‘labor peace’ can readily be achieved ‘through
means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms’ than
the assessment of agency fees.80
Justice Alito describes the “risk of free riders” as a contention that
“agency fees are needed to prevent nonmembers from enjoying the benefits
of union representation without shouldering the costs.”81 He notes that this
school teachers, who resigned their union membership and objected to paying the
nonchargeable portion of their agency fee each year, asked the federal district court to declare
the “opt out” procedures employed by their union to enable the nonmember teachers avoid
making financial contributions in support of nonchargeable union expenditures violated their
First Amendment Rights. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the
defendant union, stating the “parties do not dispute that Abood and Mitchell foreclose
Plaintiffs' claims, and the Court agrees that these decisions are controlling.” Id. at 2.).
78
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 2466.
81
Id.
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contention fails scrutiny: “Suppose that a particular group lobbies or speaks
out on behalf of what it thinks are the needs of senior citizens or veterans or
physicians, to take just a few examples. Could the government require that
all seniors, veterans, or doctors pay for that service even if they object? It has
never been thought that this is permissible.”82 Nor does the fact that the
unions are required to serve as the exclusive bargaining agent for all public
employees (whether or not they are members of the union) justify the
imposition of agency fees, because, Justice Alito notes, being designated as
the exclusive representative confers many benefits. These benefits include
giving the union a “privileged place in negotiation,” conferring a
“tremendous increase in the power of the unions,” and granting the union
“special privileges,” such as access to information about the employees and
having “dues and fees deducted directly from the employee wages.” These
benefits, the Court noted, greatly outweigh any extra burden imposed by the
duty of providing fair representation for nonmembers,” i.e., not acting
“solely in the interests of [the union’s] own members.”83 Similarly, Justice
Alito states, representing nonmembers in grievance proceedings “furthers the
union's interest in keeping control of the administration of the collectivebargaining agreement,” because (1) the resolution of one employee's
grievance can affect others,” and (2) the union’s control of the grievance
process effectively subordinates “the interests of [an] individual employee . .
. to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit.”84 Hence,
Justice Alito concludes, “agency fees cannot be upheld on free-rider
grounds.”85
The Court then considered and rejected the arguments advanced by the
union that mandatory agency fees were constitutional under the First
Amendment. In response to the union’s argument that the First Amendment
as originally enacted was not designed to provide any free speech protection
to public employees,86 the Court ruled that the union offered no basis for
concluding Abood is supported by the original understanding of the First
Amendment. In response to the union’s argument that the union’s activities
were work related and therefore not considered protected speech under
Pickering,87 the Court ruled that there was “no good reason . . . to shoehorn
82
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Id. at 2467.
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Id. at 2468
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Id. at 2469.
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Id.
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Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In Pickering a high school teacher
wrote a letter criticizing the school board’s allocation of funds between academic and athletic
programs. The letter was published in a local newspaper in the middle of a campaign by the
school board to gain voter approval of a tax increase, and the school board fired Pickering in
retaliation. Id. at 564. Noting that the government funding of education is a matter of public
83
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Abood into the Pickering framework,”88 and that, even if that attempt were
made, “Pickering is a poor fit indeed.”89 In response to the union’s argument
that “union speech in collective-bargaining and grievance proceedings should
be treated like the employee speech in Garcetti,90 i.e. as speech pursuant to
an employer’s official duties” which is not protected by the First
Amendment, the Court determined that the “argument distorts collective
bargaining and grievance adjustment beyond recognition” and that “if the
union's speech is really the employer's speech, then the employer could
dictate what the union says. Unions, we trust, would be appalled by such a
suggestion.”91 Having dispatched the First Amendment arguments advanced
by the union, the Court concluded that “public-sector agency-shop
arrangements violate the First Amendment, and Abood erred in concluding
otherwise.”92 The only remaining question, then, was whether the Court
should overrule Abood.
The Court delineated the five most important factors in determining
whether Abood should be overruled: “the quality of Abood 's reasoning, the
workability of the rule it established, its consistency with other related
decisions, developments since the decision was handed down, and reliance
on the decision.”93 Addressing the first factor, the Court states “Abood was
poorly reasoned,” because it incorrectly relied on Hanson94 and Street95 in
concern and that teachers as members of the community have informed opinions on how
school funds should be spent and should be able to speak freely on such questions without fear
of retaliation, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the teacher’s letter was protected by the
First Amendment, Further, because the teacher’s letter did not disrupt the harmony of his
workplace or affect the delivery of educational services, because Pickering did not have a
close working relationship with either school board members or the superintendent at whom
his criticisms were directed, and because Pickering’s letter addressed and informed a matter of
public concern best resolved through open debate, his dismissal from public employment
violated the First Amendment. Id. at 571-72, 574-75.
88
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2472.
89
Id. at 2474.
90
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). In Garcetti, the Court held that “when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline.” Id. at 421. In reaching this decision, the Court
stated government speech trumps government employee speech whenever the employee’s
expression “owes its existence to [the] employee's professional responsibilities,” id. at 421-22,
and is created pursuant to “the duties the employee is actually expected to perform.” Id. at
424-25.
91
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474.
92
Id. at 2478.
93
Id. at 2478-79.
94
Railway Employes’ Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). In Hanson, employees of the
Union Pacific Railroad brought suit in Nebraska courts against the railroad and the labor
organizations representing employees of the railroad to enjoin the enforcement of a union shop
agreement, which required all employees of the railroad to become members of the union
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validating the agency arrangement. Those decisions, the Court insisted, did
not validate the payment of agency fees; rather, they simply determined that
Congress authorized private sector union shops under the Railway Labor
Act.96 Furthermore, Abood incorrectly applied a deferential standard in
determining the constitutionality of agency fees that is unsupported by free
speech cases, failed to evaluate independently the strength of the government
interests cited to support the imposition of agency fees, and did not assess
whether agency fees actually promoted those interests.97 If Abood had
considered these interests properly, the Court insisted, it might not have
made the serious mistake of assuming that “labor peace” was a substantial
government interest and that the designation of the union as the exclusive
within sixty days. Id. at 227. The plaintiff employees were not members of the union, did not
want to become members of the union, and did not want to lose their jobs and employments
benefits if they refused to join the union. The employees argued that the union shop
arrangement authorized by the Railway Labor Act violated the “right to work” provision of the
Nebraska constitution. Id. at 227-28. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the union shop
provisions of the Railway Labor Act as a valid exercise by Congress of its powers under the
Commerce clause to “regulate labor relations in interstate commerce,” “encourage the
settlement of disputes,” and achieve “[i]ndustrial peace along the arteries of commerce.” Id. at
233. The U.S. Supreme Court also ruled the union shop arrangement did not violate the First
Amendment rights of the union members, noting that “there is no more an infringement or
impairment of First Amendment rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by
state law is required to be a member of an integrated bar,” that the record contained nothing to
demonstrate that mandatory membership in the union impaired the union members’ freedom
of expression, and that the statutory restriction against any conditions upon membership in the
union except for the payment of dues, initiation fees, and assessments safeguarded the union
members freedom of expression. Id. at 238.
95
International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). In Street, members
of a group of labor organizations representing workers employed by the Southern Railway
System in a union shop arrangement sought injunctive relief against the enforcement of the
collective bargaining agreement, because the unions expended member dues to finance
political campaigns of candidates for state and federal offices whom they opposed and to
promote political ideologies with which they disagreed. The U.S. Supreme Court refrained
from deciding the constitutionality of the Railway Labor Act which authorized the union shop
arrangement. Rather, the Court construed the Railway Labor Act as prohibiting expenditures
of union members’ dues without their consent to assist candidates for public office or advance
political causes and permitting unions to spend member sues to cover the expenses of
collective bargaining and administration and disposition of grievances and disputes without
the members’ consent. Id. at 750, 763-64. The Court carefully reviewed the history of union
security in the railway industry and the legislative history of the Railway Labor Act, and
concluded: (1) “§ 2, Eleventh contemplated compulsory unionism to force employees to share
the costs of negotiating and administering collective agreements, and the costs of the
adjustment and settlement of disputes,” id. at 764; (2) Congress refrained from giving unions
“unlimited power to spend exacted money,” id. at 768; and (3) § 2, Eleventh, “is to be
construed to deny the unions, over an employee’s objection, the power to use his exacted
funds to support political causes which he opposes.” Id. at 768-69.
96
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478-79.
97
Id. at 2480.
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bargaining agent is inextricably linked to the imposition of agency fees.98
Nor did Abood properly consider the difference between public- and privatesector agency shops. More particularly, collective bargaining with a
government employer, unlike collective bargaining in the private sector,
inherently involved political speech. Hence, Justice Alito, concludes, “Abood
was not well reasoned.”99
Addressing the second factor – the workability of the rule it established
– the Court notes that “Abood 's line between chargeable and nonchargeable
union expenditures has proved to be impossible to draw with precision.”100
While the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to provide some precision in
Lehnert,101 in which the court adopted a three-part test to determine if
expenses were chargeable, each of the three factors involves a substantial
judgment call reducing the test to an amorphous standard that invited
litigation.102 Moreover, the Court observes, the union concedes Abood’s
chargeable and nonchargeable categories suffer from vagueness and invites
the Court to revisit Abood and draw a firmer line. This concession, the Court
notes, “underscores the reality that Abood has proved unworkable.”103
Crucially, this lack of precision makes the task of challenging the union’s
classification of expenses “daunting and expensive,” as evidenced by the
Hudson notices under scrutiny in Janus and in the other cases that have come
before the court which lack “sufficient information to gauge the propriety of
the union’s fee.”104
Addressing the third factor – consistency with other related decisions –
Justice Alito repeated his characterization of Abood as an “anomaly,” as
noted above in the discussion of Harris105 and Knox.106 Moreover, the Court
98
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Id. at 2481.
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Id.
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Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, 500 U.S. 507 (1991). In Lehnert, faculty members
employed by Ferris State College, a state-related public institution of higher education
supported by the State of Michigan, objected to the expenditures of funds by the Ferris Faculty
Association, the exclusive bargaining representative of the faculty in an agency shop
arrangement. The objecting faculty members claimed that the expenditures in question were
used for purposes other than negotiating and administering the collective bargaining
agreement, thereby violating their First Amendment Rights. Id. at 511. The U.S. Supreme
Court developed a three-part test to determine if the expenses were chargeable: “[C]hargeable
activities must (1) be ‘germane’ to collective-bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the
government’s vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding ‘free riders’; and (3) not
significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of an agency
or union shop.” Id. at 519.
102
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2481.
103
Id. at 2481-82.
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Id. at 2482.
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Harris is discussed supra at notes 69-75.
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Knox is discussed supra at notes 56 and 58-68. Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2483.
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observed, subsequent decisions addressing compelled speech and association
“employed exacting scrutiny, if not a more demanding standard” of review,
which was lacking in Abood.107 Likewise, as noted above in the discussion of
Knox and Harris, the Court declined to extend Abood in other agency fee
cases “beyond the circumstances where it directly controls.”108 Further, the
Court notes that Abood “particularly sticks out when viewed against our
cases holding that public employees generally may not be required to support
a political party.”109 “It is an odd feature of our First Amendment cases,” the
Court observes, “that political patronage has been deemed largely
unconstitutional, while forced subsidization of union speech (which has no
such pedigree) has been largely permitted.”110
Addressing the fourth factor – developments since the decision was
handed down – the Court declared “[d]evelopments since Abood, both factual
and legal, have also ‘eroded’ the decision's ‘underpinnings’ and left it an
outlier among our First Amendment cases.”111 To begin with, Abood is based
on the unsupported assumption that the principle of exclusive representation
in the public sector depends on either a union or an agency shop, an
assumption belied by the above noted analysis of union membership in the
public sector.112 Second, an unanticipated increase in membership in public
sector unions – public sector union memberships exceeds private sector
union membership, even though there are nearly four times as many private
sector employees as public sector employees – has triggered a parallel
increase in public sector spending, and wages, benefits, and pensions have
played a substantial role in that increase. These developments and the related
political debate over public spending and debt have given public sector
collective bargaining political power and influence that Abood did not
anticipate.113
Addressing the fifth factor – reliance on the decision – the Court
rejected the union’s argument that collective-bargaining agreements
107

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2483.
Id.
109
Id. at 2484 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (dismissing noncivil, Cook County
employees for their refusal to join the political party of the current sheriff violated the First
Amendment); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (continuing employment of county public
defenders cannot be conditioned on their changing their party affiliation from Republican to
Democratic); Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990) (conditioning hiring
decisions of low-level, public employees on the political beliefs and party affiliation violates
the First Amendment); and O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712
(1996) (removal of towing company from city’s list of approved towing service companies for
refusal to support a political party violated the First Amendment)).
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presently in effect were negotiated with the expectation agency fees would
continue, in exchange for which the union may have surrendered other
benefits. “It would be unconscionable,” the Court stated, “to permit free
speech rights to be abridged in perpetuity in order to preserve contract
provisions that will expire on their own in a few years' time.”114 Indeed, the
Court stressed, “public-sector unions have been on notice for years regarding
this Court's misgivings about Abood,” as spelled out in Knox, Harris, and
Friedrichs, discussed above.115 Hence, “any public-sector union seeking an
agency-fee provision in a collective-bargaining agreement must have
understood that the constitutionality of such a provision was uncertain.”116
This is particularly true, the Court insisted, with respect to the collective
bargaining agreement in Janus. The original term of the agreement was July
1, 2012, to June 30, 2015, after which the agreement was automatically
renewed annually, neither party having given notice it wanted to amend or
terminate the agreement. This caused the Court to observe that “the Union
could not have been confident about the continuation of the agency-fee
arrangement for more than a year at a time.”117 Similarly, the Court noted,
the collective-bargaining agreement contains a severability clause which
keeps the remaining provisions of the contract in effect in the event any part
of the agreement was invalidated. Any union believing that an agency-fee
provision was essential to its bargain,” the Court stated, “could have insisted
on a provision giving [the agency-fee provision] greater protection.”118 While
the Court recognized that “the loss of payments from nonmembers may cause
unions to experience unpleasant transition costs in the short term, and may
require unions to make adjustments in order to attract and retain members,” it
declared that the “unconstitutional exactions cannot be allowed to continue
indefinitely.”119
The Court concluded: “All these reasons – that Abood 's proponents
have abandoned its reasoning, that the precedent has proved unworkable, that
it conflicts with other First Amendment decisions, and that subsequent
developments have eroded its underpinnings – provide the special
justification[s] for overruling Abood.”120 The Court then held: (1) states and
public-sector unions are prohibited from extracting agency fees from
nonconsenting employees, (2) “[n]either an agency fee nor any other
payment to the union may be deducted from a nonmember’s wages, nor may
any other attempt be made to collect such a payment, unless the employee
114
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affirmatively consents to pay,” and (3) nonmembers who agree to pay waive
their First Amendment rights, and, in order to be effective, that waiver must
be freely given, evidenced by clear and compelling evidence, and obtained
before any money is taken.121 Finally, the Court stated, “Abood was wrongly
decided and is now overruled.”122

V. JANUS’S IMPACT ON UNIONS
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Kagan identifies the immediate
ramifications of Janus:
[Janus] will have large-scale consequences. Public employee
unions will lose a secure source of financial support. State and local
governments that thought fair-share provisions furthered their
interests will need to find new ways of managing their workforces.
Across the country, the relationships of public employees and
employers will alter in both predictable and wholly unexpected
ways.123
Justice Kagan notes that over 22 states, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico have enacted statutes authorizing fair-share provisions, and two
additional states have fair-share provisions for their police and firefighter
unions.124 Moreover, many of those states have multiple statutory provisions
with variations of fair-share provisions for different categories of public
employees.125 The parties to these agreements will now be required to “revise
(or redo) multiple contracts simultaneously,” a chore made much more
difficult because the parties will now have to “replace a term that [they]
never expected to change.”126 This bargaining, she cautions, will likely be
complicated and possibly contentious given the interests at stake.127
121
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By cutting off the flow of agency fees to unions, Janus will cost unions,
already under considerable political pressure, to lose tens of millions of
dollars and to see their effectiveness diminished.128 Benjamin Sachs, the
Kestnbaum Professor of Labor and Industry at Harvard Law School,
analogizes the problem Janus creates to a decision by the government to
make taxes voluntary. Fewer people would pay taxes and the ability of
government to provide services would erode. 129 Worse, unions representing
public sector employees will likely experience a significant drop in
membership and union members will experience a significant drop in wages.
As noted in an article in The Atlantic:
A study by Frank Manzo, the policy director of the Illinois
Economic Policy Institute, and Robert Bruno, a labor professor at
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, found that a
decision in favor of Janus could reduce the union membership of
state and local government employees by 8.2 percentage points, or
726,000 union members. This will lead to a loss of revenues for the
unions, and with less money, unions will hire fewer representatives,
take fewer cases to arbitration, and organize fewer members than
they once did, Bruno told me. This will likely mean lower pay and
benefits for public-sector employees: Manzo and Bruno estimate
the wages of state and local government employees would drop by
an average of 3.6 percent, and the salaries of public-school teachers
would drop by an average of 5.4 percent.130
One projection indicates that “[m]ost public-sector unions in more than
20 states with agency fee laws will get smaller and poorer, with unions losing
between a tenth and a third of their members.131 Union membership in the
Ruling Is a Blow to Public Unions. It’s Especially Bad for Black Women, GOVERNING (July 9,
2018), http://www.governing.com/topics/workforce/gov-supreme-court-janus-unions-womenworkers-lc.html.
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United Domestic Workers of America (UDW), which represents home-care
workers in California, declined dramatically from 68,000 to 48,000
immediately following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Harris, which did
for home-care worker what Janus had now done for all public-sector
unions.132 Likewise, in the five year period following Michigan’s passing
legislation ending mandatory union fees in 2012, membership in the
Michigan Education Association dropped about 25%.133 Similarly, the
National Education Association (NEA), the nation’s largest union, fears it
will lose about 300,000 members over the next two years, or about 10% of its
3 million members.134 Moreover, to the extent Janus weakens unions and
negatively affects about 17 million public sector workers across the country,
it will hurt black women in particular, because they are disproportionately
represented in public sector jobs and make up 17.7 percent of public sector
workers, or about 1.5 million workers.135 Likewise, weakened labor unions
will likely be unable to sustain their progress in narrowing the wage gap
between men and women.136
In preparation for and response to Janus, unions have cut their budgets –
the NEA is prepared to cut about $28 million from its budget and about 40
members of its staff137 – and embarked on campaigns to convince union
Julianna Feliciano Reyes, Changing work scene after Janus decision, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug.
31, 2018), p. A11,
http://digital.olivesoftware.com/Olive/ODN/PhiladelphiaInquirer/Default.aspx:
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and even dues – they say they were illegally forced to pay to unions.
132
Semuels, supra note 124. Notably, however, UDW membership in California has
rebounded, and today it has 75,000 dues paying members, largely due to an effective
recruiting campaign which proved UDW was providing valuable service not only to the union
members but also to their clients. Moreover, because of aging population, the number of
potential members has grown significantly as well. Id.
133
Scheiber, supra note 131.
134
Moriah Balingit & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Unions brace for loss of members and fees in
wake of Supreme Court ruling, CHI. TRIB., June 28, 2018.
135
Celine McNicholas & Janelle Jones, Black women will be most affected by Janus, ECON.
POL’Y INST. (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/black-women-will-be-mostaffected-by-janus/.
136
Charles, supra note 127 (“Labor unions . . . have helped women of all backgrounds close
gaps in pay and career advancement, according to recent BLS data. When not represented by a
union, black women typically earn 67 cents for every dollar earned by a white male, while
white women make 80 cents for every dollar earned by a white male. But the gap closes for
union employees, with black women earning 72 cents for every dollar earned by a white man,
and white women earning 88 cents for every dollar made by a white male worker.”).
137
Balingit, supra note 134.

210/Vol. XXIX/Southern Law Journal

members to sign pledge cards confirming their commitment to the union.138
The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) conducted one-on-one meetings
with union members and potential members asking them to sign “recommit”
cards in 10 states pledging to continue their membership in the AFT. This
campaign generated 530,000 recommits among its 1.7 million members,139
and recommitment rates up to 95 percent in some places.140 Similarly, the
National Education Association (NEA) has reached out to its members with a
pledge to fight for racial justice and equal distribution of resources in
addition to just salary wages.141 That unions can demonstrate strong
commitment by their members is crucially important, because Janus has
created the perception that unions have less money, less support from
politicians, and therefore less power at the bargaining table in terms of being
able to put pressure on the employer.142
Although the U.S. Supreme Court in Janus emphasized the difference
between public- and private-sector agency shops and noted that collective
bargaining with a government employer, unlike collective bargaining in the
private sector, inherently involves political speech,143 some legal
commentators believe Janus may ultimately be applied to private sector
unions. Robert Bruno, labor professor at the University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign, worries that the Janus may help right-to-work activists bring a
constitutional challenge to mandatory fees in private sector unions.144 Cesar
Rosado, co-director of the Institute for Law and the Workplace at ChicagoKent College of Law, believes there is no significant difference between the
First Amendment issue in the public sector and the private sector.145 He notes
that private sector employees are governed by the National Labor Relations
Act, which requires employers to bargain with the union employees have
voted to represent them. Those unions impose mandatory dues and fees that
support lobbying efforts and political campaigns for a wide variety of public
causes, including public spending and minimum wage levels, which
employers may oppose and which may impact government spending, thereby
opening the door to Janus challenges.146
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VI. SUMMARY
Two decisions handed down during the 2017-2018 Supreme Court Term
has inflicted substantial legal damage on workers and unions. In Epic
Systems, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld arbitration agreements which
prohibit collective actions to recover overtime pay owed under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. This decision seriously weakens a significant employee
safeguard under the National Labor Relations Act, and pits individual
employees seeking to enforce their right to overtime compensation against
the enterprise which hired them, a lopsided confrontation indeed, particularly
for employees who fear retaliation. Moreover, the decision facilitates the
under enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act by making it cost
beneficial for employers to underpay workers. Because the expense in
pursuing individual claims outweighs the potential recovery, there is no
incentive to seek redress and the “enforcement gap” will widen. Hence the
ongoing and substantial loss by low wage earners of billions of dollars of
legally owed wages per year will likely continue unabated. Moreover,
because arbitration decisions can be kept confidential and lack precedential
effect, the individually pursued arbitrations will likely give rise to
incompatible awards in similar claims and inconsistent legal decisions.
Janus has inflicted equally devastating results on public sector labor
unions, which will likely get smaller and poorer. Public sector unions will
experience a significant loss of a secure source of financial support which
generated tens of millions of dollars in agency fees paid by nonmember
public employees. Labor unions in twenty-two states, the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico must quickly and simultaneously renegotiate their
public sector collective bargaining agreements in an atmosphere of strained
labor relations and more radical union actions. Public sector employees may
experience an average 3.6 percent drop in wages, and the salaries of publicschool teachers may drop by an average of 5.4 percent. Public sector unions
will likely lose between a tenth and a third of their members, and must
combat the perception that public sector unions have less money, less support
from politicians, and therefore less power at the bargaining table. Public
sector labor unions have been forced to slash their budgets and reduce
services to their members, at the same time as they undertake campaigns to
convince members to confirm their commitment to the union. Finally, Janus
has opened the door to First Amendment attacks on agency fee arrangements
in private sector collective bargaining agreements.

